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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Stanley M. Moskowitz
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SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment - USSR-EE

1. Soviet Leadership Situation.A. Discussion.

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A plenum in mid-June, the first since last November, is now all but certain given the announcement of a Supreme Soviet meeting on 16 June. Analysts are agreed that (1) the plenum will be a crucial one for Andropov, and (2) that things seem to be going his way. [redacted] believes that Andropov will be able to make at least some of the following personnel shifts at the plenum:

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- taking over the head of state job himself, or shunting Brezhnev crony Tikhonov into it to make room for Aliyev as Chairman of the Council of Ministers;

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- promoting new Central Committee Department heads Ryzhkov and Ligachev into the Secretariat;
- making Party Secretary Dolgih a full member of the Politburo and some other recent appointees candidate members, for instance, Byelorussian Party First Secretary Slyunkov.

Some analysts believe that if Andropov is strong enough to put his mark on this Plenum, he will do so on substantive as well as on personnel matters. The majority view, however, is that if Andropov wants to put out a new substantive line -- perhaps dealing with economic organization -- he will wait for the fall or winter Plenum.

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INR believes that Chernenko is finished politically. CIA and DIA are not ready to count him totally out of the picture; DIA believes, however, that he might be retired with dignity at the Plenum.

2. Poland on the Eve of the Papal Visit.

A. Discussion.

Church and the regime are working together to ensure that the Pope's visit occurs in a calm atmosphere. Jaruzelski's purpose is to utilize the visit as a lever to induce the West to normalize relations. The outcome could be a pacified country living under a tacit Church-regime alliance, that was politically more acceptable in the West. But to get this, Jaruzelski may well have had to make concessions to the Church, possibly including general amnesties, more explicit recognition of Church rights, and generally less oppressive policies. While the Church is undoubtedly pulling Jaruzelski in that direction, the Soviets are probably worried that he could, or has, made too many concessions and are probably exerting countervailing pressure. Additionally, it is no means certain that the regime will be strengthened even by a Papal visit which goes according to plan. The visit might make it all too obvious that the regime may be in control of the country but that it does not enjoy the allegiance of the population. There is also the chance that, despite the efforts of all concerned, the enormous crowds turned out by the Pope's visit will get out of control in unpredictable ways. In sum, the visit is a calculated risk which shows Jaruzelski's strength in that he is willing to risk the Pope's coming -- and Soviet displeasure -- but also his weakness in that he needs the Church to strengthen his position .

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3. The CEMA Summit.

A. Discussion.

All accounts suggest that the Soviets have given up hope of holding the CEMA summit this June. Romania and Hungary were apparently the most vocal opponents of Soviet plans to more fully integrate the various CEMA economies and to tie them closer to the USSR, while simultaneously decreasing Soviet energy subsidies.

B. Implications.

The Soviets undoubtedly will continue to press for closer CEMA integration and possibly a summit.

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4. Soviet Strategy in the Middle East after the Shultz visit.

A. Discussion.

The Soviets are following a two-track policy. (1) They are encouraging the Syrians and the PLO to undermine the Lebanese accord, and they have been contributing to the general level of tension in the region by their three-month old warnings of impending Israeli attack and; (2) They are trying to build ties with moderate Arabs, almost all of whom have expressed support for the Lebanese accord. The first track is the most important one for the Soviets and the most risky. Moscow's principal short-term objective is that the Syrians not be drawn into the peace process. The Soviets will work to that end, even at the risk of another round of fighting between the Syrians and the Israelis.

It seems unlikely that Moscow favors new fighting anytime soon, because of the good prospect that (a) the Syrians, and Soviet armament, will be humiliated again (b) the Soviets own greatly increased military presence in Syria will prove ineffective either in deterring the Israelis from attacking Syrians in Lebanon or in significantly helping the Syrians fight the Israelis; (c) the Soviets will be drawn into the fighting either because of attacks on their SA-5 sites or through pressure to come to the aid of the

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Syrians in Lebanon (which will be hard to resist, in view of Soviet advice to Syria to hang-tough) and (d) there will be pressure to get even more heavily involved in Syria in the wake of another Syrian humiliation. One minority view is that the Soviets will encourage the Syrians to fight precisely because they want a reason to get a greater military presence in Syria.

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